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ABSTRACT 
 
Preconditions for Adopting Inflation Targeting Framework: An Empirical 
Evidence for Small Economies 
 
By 
 
GATHONI, Anthony Gathogo 
 
In the past decades, the monetary policy encountered by most of the low-income economies 
has been depressing, this has resulted to extreme periods of monetary instability, vacillating 
from high inflation, to colossal capital flight, and thereby leading to the downfall of many 
financial systems. However, the forecast for successful monetary policy transformation in the 
majority of these countries has been remarkable in forecasting future inflation expectations. 
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical framework analyzing preconditions that relate 
to low-income countries and emerging markets likelihood of adopting inflation targeting 
framework in a sample that comprises both inflation targeters and non-targeters countries 
covering a period of 1990-2009. The panel data model protracted for analysis will comprise 
both macro-economic variables and institutional arrangements plausible for the adoption of 
inflation-targeting framework for these countries. The findings have indicated that, the 
decision to forge towards IT-framework requires resolute efforts and support in addressing 
the main drawbacks that may hinder successful implementation of IT-framework to a larger 
extent on the technical aspects and capability of most of low-income as well as emerging 
countries, which are limited or lacking.  
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CHARPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
An aura of cynicism has demonized most government authorities‘ efforts to cut down prices 
of major commodities, which has a negative influence over majority of small economies. 
Indeed, the price levels have skyrocketed in the recent past coupled with dwindling wage 
levels, weakening of national currency against other major currencies and declining growth 
rate in Low-income countries. In spite of concerted efforts instituted by majority of these 
countries governments‘, only a few have been able to achieve their inflation target or close to 
the target, though, others are following the same  progress in achieving price stability and 
increasing economic growth rate. In contrast, inflation volatilities have declined dramatically 
since early 1990s in high income countries as well in the middle upper countries.  
 
Indeed most governments‘ have embarked on instituting fundamental reforms through the 
introduction of avant-garde monetary policy regimes, which forge the way forward through, 
which the monetary authority are supposed to re-design their policy, thereby, focusing 
primarily on numerically anchoring inflation to a band or target. One of the major reforms 
that authorities in most of the upper-income level countries and few middle upper-income 
countries focused on in early 1990‘s was, the introduction of Inflation Targeting Framework 
(henceforth ―IT-framework‖)-a monetary policy framework aimed at monitoring and 
controlling price stability after a prolonged period of disinflation. Nevertheless, Masson et al. 
(1997), and Cukierman et al (1992); have pointed out that, for an effective and successful 
implementation of IT-framework, there should be other overriding reforms, for example, the 
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level of independence from political interference i.e. Central bank autonomy
1
, and other 
monetary policy designs (exchange rate framework, monetary aggregate and credit control). 
They caution against the central bank emphasizing on any other monetary policy design, but 
instead focus on explicitly anchoring inflation. Other nominal anchor strategies instituted in 
the past comprises of  monetary aggregate targeting, exchange rate targeting, and implicit 
form of nominal anchor rather than explicit nominal anchor, (Mishkin, 1999a). Notably, 
majority of these countries that anchor their inflation have perceived IT-framework as their 
best choice in conducting monetary policy, with none abandoning the regime, save for 
Finland and Spain, that have already joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) since late 
90‘s. 2 
 
In the past, majority of these countries mainly from Latin America countries, East Asia 
countries and some parts of Europe had experienced high bout of inflation and financial 
crises exacerbated by their former monetary policy regimes. These not only resulted to 
sacrificing output and employment but also resulted to severe increase in international capital 
flow leading to a switch to floating exchange rate and also redesigning there monetary policy 
approach.
3
  
                                                          
 
 
1
 Note the paper will use the following words interchangeably to refer to the same things- central bank 
autonomy and central bank independence, central bank and authority, and monetary policy 
stance/strategy/regime. 
2
 In their study, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000), argues that the regime had proved to most authorities as 
the best choice in the 21
st
 century. Arguably, Freedman (2001) has made similar findings on the case for Canada 
that adopted inflation targeting after New Zealand in 1990. Notably, the EMU uses hybrid strategy characterized 
by either moving or multiple targets in order to meet its mandate of price stability. 
3
 However, Pétursson (2000) state that, the inverse relatioship between inflation and unemployment is not 
different in both inflation targeting and non-inflation targerting countries, since price stability is the main goal of 
IT-framework.   
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1.1 Definition, General Salient Features, and Critics of IT-Framework 
IT-framework; an approach to management of monetary policy
4
 was first pioneered by the 
New Zealand Government in 1990 after it abandoned its pegged exchange rate five years 
later. By the year 2009, over twenty-five countries comprised of developed, emerging, and 
developing countries around the world had explicitly espoused an inflation target as their 
nominal anchor, and have reported greater achievement of low inflation rate. 
 
Most policy makers and economists have given slightly different views as to what constitutes 
the definition of IT-Framework. However, there is an agreement of the major aspects of IT-
framework revolves around an explicit inflation targets objective, free from fiscal control and  
other overriding central bank objectives; central bank independence and transparency to its 
public (Aliyu & Englama, 2009). IT-framework is also exemplified; ―by the public 
announcement of official quantitative targets (or target range) for the inflation rate, over one 
or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgment, that low, stable inflation is the 
monetary policy‘s primary long-run goal.‖ (Ghalwash, 2010).  Nonetheless, all literatures 
converge into what Bernanke, et al. (1999) and Mishkin (2004) have summarized as the main 
elements that form a surmise of pre-requisites for long lasting implementation of IT-
framework. That is: (i) the public pronouncement of medium-term inflation target; (ii) central 
bank primary objective is price stability; (iii) a comprehensive approach of setting monetary 
policy instruments; (iv) high degree of transparency in the conduct of monetary policy; (v) 
accountable central bank in achieving her primary objective in this case price stability. 
 
In their literatures, Svensson (1997); Friedman, (1990); McCallum, (1990) comprehensively 
                                                          
 
4
 The work of Svensson (1997a) alludes to ―degree of transparency, credibility, and accountability‖ are 
requirements for central banks to switch to IT-framework. 
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argues their case on what constituted IT-framework by indicating that the framework is 
supposed to be highly correlated with the goal itself. Similarly, both the public and the central 
bank should comply with it resourcefully. They also saw transparency of the authority to be 
part of an efficient and effective central bank in communicating to the public its objectives 
and procedure of conducting its monetary stance.  
 
Bernanke, et al. (1999); and Svensson (1997) in support of the above elements have indicated 
that price stability is a key component of the authority‘s performance based appraisal. Indeed, 
they elucidate the authority should issue a declaration, which states the inflation nominal 
target/band within a definite time horizon in order to curb instances of falling into time-
inconsistency trap in carrying out its primary goal. Consequently, the government can opt to 
choose the target independently or collectively with the central bank, which is associated with 
appropriate changes in the authority‘s governing laws thus enhancing its degree of autonomy.  
 
The public should also access information from the bank with much ease through enhanced 
communication channels and increased accountability of the authority. More often, the 
authority should be in the forefront of periodically publishing inflation reports to inform the 
public of the future inflation expectations and any other adjustments that the central bank 
would undertake incase there are pronounced deviations of inflation targets. Work by  
Bernanke, et al. (1999) depicts the notion of ―constrained discretion‖ that this framework of 
monetary policy proposes.
5
 
Svensson (1997) state that, when the authority anticipate the policy target deviation, the 
strategy should be attuned in such a way that it is neither contractionary nor is it expansionary 
                                                          
 
5
 Note: The ―constraint‖ is the official targets enforced by the authority; while authority takes actions through 
―discretion‖ in order to cater for any economic disturbances, in particular, output or financial stability 
disturbance 
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in accordance with keeping the policy on target. On this background, the IT-framework work 
best in forecasting future inflation, that is, the relevant information for forecasting monetary 
policy is of greater importance in predicting future inflation. Indeed, this transparency of 
inflation targeting forms a better juncture in terms of motivating and forecasting the activities 
inside the central bank. More so, reinforcement of central bank accountability and credibility 
is of greater importance in case of breach of inflation target, through clarification of the 
authority‘s capability.  
 
Work by Mishkin, (2000) has showed positive contribution of the IT-framework in 
industrialized countries. He argues that, IT-framework has successfully enabled these 
countries to control inflation even during economic downturn. Accordingly, there has been 
remarkable monitoring and weakening of inflationary shocks, and reduced output variations 
in these countries. Likewise, IT-framework is also advantageous over other nominal anchor, 
in that, it make it possible for the authority to emphasis on domestic considerations and 
effectively and efficiently offset inflationary shocks that may be of domestic or foreign 
sources respectively. It also uses all available information that enables the authority to make a 
decisive move in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and it offset money and 
inflation relationship effects. 
 
Although, inflation targeting has proved to be the best monetary policy for the last decade it 
does not lack some criticism that characterizes it in terms of implementation and monitoring. 
Svensson (1997) has described some of the inherent problems that makes this strategy 
ineffective, which includes: central bank‘s inability to restrain inflation due to the fact that, 
previous decisions and contracts determine current inflation. In other words, the authority can 
only forecast future inflation. Another setback is lack of proper mechanism for monitoring 
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and evaluation of this strategy by public due to inadequate public awareness of immediate 
inflation deviations from the stated inflation targets. Mishkin and Savastano, (2000) have 
disparaged IT-framework as, too rigid; indistinguishable to full discretion; swells output 
unsteadiness; hurts economic expansion in terms of growth; is likely to generate weakness in 
the accountability of central bank; it lack structures tenable for keeping check on fiscal 
dominance; and requires exchange rate flexibility which could impact negatively on the 
financial system. Indeed, controlling inflation pause a major blow to majority of low-income 
countries, and that there are pronounced lags emanating from monetary instruments to the 
inflation outcome. 
1.2 Research questions and objectives of the study  
This paper depicts lessons learned by countries that have already adopted the strict IT-
framework since 1990‘s. What becomes apparently evident in the process of this review, 
however, is the need to explore several contributory situations before making an informed 
judgment on the likelihood of low-income countries embracing the framework. The first of 
these situations is whether there are incentives and aspects linked with decisions to move 
from a specific monetary practice to another. Second situation revolves around the feasibility 
of other policy designs of monetary policy. Third situations will address chief pitfalls that 
hamper low-income countries from embracing this policy design. The study objective is to 
investigate the relationship between preconditions that lead to adoption of IT-framework in 
developed and emerging economies and to examine if these preconditions have a replicate 
effect in low-income countries. 
The other body structure of the paper follows the following sequence. Chapter 2; reviews 
various literatures that pay attention to the main pre-conditions for embracing IT-framework 
and other institutional arrangements. Chapter 3; reviews the methodological propositions, 
data and statistical findings acceptable to low-income countries adopting IT-framework. My 
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findings have indicated that countries under consideration can only have a partial IT-
framework rather than a full–fledged one. However, there is huge discrepancy for countries to 
adopt IT-framework due to underdeveloped financial institutions, poor macroeconomic 
performance, and lack of central banks autonomy. The findings have also indicated that the 
decision to forge towards IT-framework requires resolute efforts and support in addressing 
the main drawbacks that may hinder successful implementation of IT-framework to a larger 
extent on the technical aspects and capability of most of low-income as well as emerging 
countries which are limited or lacking. 
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CHARPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction  
Major studies have analyzed the preconditions and effectiveness of IT-framework since its 
inception in the early 1990s. Indeed, there exist a large number of literatures on major 
developments of the IT-framework since its inception in developed countries and emerging 
economies. However, there is little development in low-income countries in regards to 
adoption and implementation of IT-framework. This is because there are greater variations in 
most of these countries due to under-developed financial markets, inadequate fiscal position, 
increased fiscal dominance, and lack of market integration. Therefore, these countries are 
only eligible in adopting partial IT-framework rather than full-fledged IT-framework (Stone, 
2002). Further analysis by Hazirolan (1999) alleges that increased accountability is 
indistinguishable to the effectiveness of the authority in monitoring inflationary expectations 
2.1 Review of alternative studies across the globe  
In the past decades, the monetary policy encountered by most of the low-income economies 
has been depressing, this has resulted to extreme periods of monetary instability, vacillating 
from high inflation, to colossal capital flight, and thereby leading to downfall of many 
financial systems. However, the forecast for successful monetary policy transformation in the 
majority of these countries is remarkable in forecasting future inflation expectations. This 
enables the central bank to be more accountable by explicitly announcing a multi-year target 
for inflation. Downes and V.aez-Zadeh (1990) declares that ―during the transition it is not 
possible to forecast market behavior…..[s]ince the old money-model is bound to be obsolete 
and perhaps of little use‖ (318). Indeed, the ‗old fashioned‘ regime of money growth 
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targeting framework in the majority of low-income countries has of late proved inefficient, 
although these countries have managed to maintain inflation rate as low as possible. Using a 
time-varying parameter model with GARCH specification, Erturk and Ozlale (2004) finds a 
positive impact of the IT-framework in controlling average expected inflation, although, they 
fail to find a robust significance of post-inflation targeting implementation in controlling 
inflation uncertainties for a sample of five industrialized countries. Nevertheless, they 
conclude by finding a structural break for these countries once they switch to IT-framework.  
 
In his analysis of impulse- response functions, Parrado (2004) argues the case for countries 
with stricter vs. flexible form of IT-framework under floating exchange rate.
6
 His outcome 
shows remarkable reduction in output volatility under flexible IT-framework than in a stricter 
one, whereas inflation stability solely depends on the type of shock.
7
 Seyfried and Bremmer 
(2003) in a cross-country analysis using dynamic Taylor-type model examine reasons for 
countries switching to IT-framework in order to keep inflation in check and they find a 
situation where these countries tend to emphasis more on restraining future inflationary 
pressures than the current inflation. Debelle (1997) takes the same position of a flexible IT-
framework where they urge countries to embrace such a strategy in order to deliver other 
objectives such as output and employment growth since they have a bearing in determining 
future inflation and that in totality a flexible IT-framework should not be indifferent in other 
mandates of monetary policy goals. Accordingly, in support of successful implementation of 
IT-framework in East Asian countries, Taguchi and Kato (2010) offers an opinion based on 
the error-correction estimates and they exposition that these countries have remarkably 
                                                          
 
6
Svensson (1999a) defines stricter IT-framework as a framework through which the central bank seeks to 
minimize any deviations in inflation from its target without including any other indicator in the response 
function. While the flexible form of IT-framework includes other indicators in the response function. 
7
 Aliyu and Abwaku (2009) ―An impulse response function traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the 
innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables‖ 
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reported reduced inflation rates in the aftermath of crisis and later adoption of IT-framework 
due to speeding-up adjustment against other monetary aggregates such as money supply. 
They also claim that the speeding-up adjustment arises due to central bank emphasis on 
pursuing other goals instead of focusing primarily to stable price stability; re-modification of 
exchange rate regime as witnessed in the aftermath of the crisis; and the resulting increase in 
monetary independence. Conversely, they conclude by finding a robust relationship between 
money and inflation that is crosscutting across all other monetary policy strategies.
8
  
 
On the macroeconomic activities platform most of the countries targeting inflation have 
reported remarkable performance during post-inflation targeting. For instance, inflation-
targeting countries have experienced greater reduction in inflation volatility and interest rates; 
significant improvement in output volatility, which is contrary to other monetary policy 
framework where it has deteriorated; and parallel to exchange rate pass-through (Mishkin & 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006). On the other hand, Walsh (2005) has offered an insightful analysis of 
IT-framework success, where he finds a reduction of average inflation in countries examined 
as a group, as well as individual country within such groups and that such effect is because of 
reduction in inflation volatility. Some theoretical underpinning argues that countries with 
multiple targets such as inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting are likely to switch to 
a dominant regime in the near future. This is because such countries faces challenges of 
choosing between the two regimes in order to avoid them conflicting in future and that 
authorities may lack focus in communicating their main target within a specified time 
horizons (Freedman and Ö tker-Robe, 2009). 
 
                                                          
 
8
 Speeding-up adjustment entails the rapidness of the authority in modifying short-term inflation rates according 
to targeted levels, (Seyfried and Bremmer, 2003). 
See Stone (2002) and Carare and Stone (2006) for further definition of Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL). 
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In contrast, Aizenman and Hutchison (2008) argue that non IT-framework targeters tend to 
pursue both IT-framework and exchange rate strategies, hence tend to conflict and result in an 
ambiguous policy stance. However, Hu (2006) provides divergent view of IT-framework 
based on Taylor curve and the results indicates incoherent credibility of the framework in the 
tradeoff between inflation and output variability. Overall, McCallum (2003) foresees a 
monetary policy strategy that is beneficial to the economic expansion and a steady inflation 
environment. Literature from IMF, (1997) and Ghosh et al, (1997) revealed that inflation 
declined in a fixed exchange rate regime, however, the regime impact to other 
macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth was not robust. 
 
Woodford (2003) perceive IT-framework as a global trend that crosscut across the board in 
the way the authority set its policy rule, and that neither involves any alternation of the 
monetary policy stance conducted by the authority. The author justify this as the move by the 
authority to announce its inflation targets, often specified within a specific inflation rate range 
or band i.e. 2%-4%; and by publicly announcing any deviation from the stated inflation 
targets, thereby, compelling the authority to  increase accountability and transparency of the 
monetary policy goal. Carare and Stone (2006) suggest that the central bank can boost 
transparency to higher levels if it periodically releases detailed reports, perfomance related 
reviews and alteration of monetary policy stance, and publication of inflation projections.  
 
Walsh (2005) mention that, declaration of an official inflation target is advantageous in that 
the public perceive inflation targets to be in line with the goal of the authority without 
incurring any cost of reducing average inflation rates. Indeed, Most of the countries that have 
switched to IT-framework have also positioned their exchange rate regime in such a way it is 
flexible enough to avoid unwanted response of exchange rate and to increase credibility of 
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the authority in terms of independence (Carare and Stone 2006). Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2007) in their panel data analysis comprising of industrial countries argues that in the 
long-run IT-framework is important in achieving stable inflation rates, especially in countries 
where oil-prices and exchange rate shocks are erratic. Similarly, Aizenman and Hutchison 
(2008) using a simple empirical model for 17 emerging markets concludes that stable 
inflation has greater effect on interests for inflation targeters in emerging markets than in 
non-inflation targeters whose central banks respond less in such markets.  
2.2 IT-framework in Sub-Saharan Africa 
In the African continent, only South Africa and Ghana have officially embraced IT-
framework in the conduct of their monetary policy, the rest of the countries in the continent 
are still searching for the avenues, in particular, fulfilling the main preconditions that 
characterizes this framework. To date South Africa has now over 10 years experience of IT-
framework having adopted it in the year 2000, whereas, Ghana‘s experience with this 
framework spans from year 2007 after the Bank of Ghana announced officially it has adopted 
IT-framework. However, even after these two countries adopted IT-framework the inflation 
volatility, output volatility have not improved, and that the inflationary shocks (supply-side 
shocks) are not internally imposed but rather external in nature, (McKinley, 2008).   
 
The other prospective African countries that have a high chance of implementing IT-
framework in the near future are Egypt and Nigeria. Aliyu and Abwaku (2009) in their work 
recommend Nigeria to adopt an inflation targeting Lite (ITL) instead of full-fledged IT-
framework- they find ―no strong quantitative link between monetary aggregates and prices.‖ 
This is because Nigeria has not yet met the preconditions necessary for it framework. On the 
other hand, Ghalwash (2010) states that the Central Bank of Egypt though a potential 
inflation targeting is characterized by huge fiscal dominance, conflicting policy instruments 
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and goals of monetary policy, underdeveloped technical infrastructure and lack of technical 
capacity in forecasting future inflation rates. In testing this policy conflict using Granger 
causality test, the author find fiscal policy having a transitory role of controlling inflation as 
well as in achieving economic growth. Porter and Yao (2005) on the institutional front in 
Mauritius indicate that the central bank has in the past reduced government borrowing, 
external debt has declined, while financial depth has improved, which are prerequisite 
necessary for inflation targeting Lite adoption. 
 
In the case of Malawi, Simwaka (2004) and Tutar (2002) in Turkey find an inflationary 
inertia phenomenon using vector auto regression (VAR) after analyzing the variables of 
interest. On the degree of openness, Al Nasser, et al, (2009) has sampled 152 countries, where 
he finds an inverse association between inflation and trade openness since 1952 to 1992. 
Consequently, the correlation between inflation and the degree of trade openness is 
unrestrictive within a group neither of countries nor to a precise time horizon. Ndung‘u (2000) 
has done comprehensive study on the dynamics of the inflationary process in Kenya since 
1970-1991. Accordingly, the results indicate that monetary growth, interest rates changes, 
real income growth and excess money printing as the main determinants of inflation in Kenya. 
Moreover, inappropriate government policies (monetary and fiscal) were the main cause of 
inflationary shocks experienced in 1980 and early 1990.  
 
 
2.2.1 An overview of the exchange rate transition and its role in ITF 
Guillermo and Reinhart (2002) have expressed their fear of emerging countries not being in 
full capacity of managing their nominal exchange rate. This is often pegged external debts 
against other international currencies, thus IT-framework becomes unrealizable due to too 
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much concern towards exchange rate volatility.
9
 In support of this, Lucotte (2010) foresee 
implementation of IT-framework to work best in those countries that have already switched to 
floating exchange rate strategy. In other words, countries operating under fixed exchange rate 
strategy may end up not fixing forever. Indeed, ―monetary target, multiple targets, or hybrid‖ 
strategies are habitually for a short-term period or are unrealized at all (Rose, 2007). 
 
In recent times, countries with fixed exchange rate have a tendency to fix their domestic 
currency value to countries whose main objective is to anchor their inflation in readiness to 
keep inflation rate in check. Most of the countries that have adopted an intermediate currency 
tend to devalue their currency at a firm rate in order to keep their inflation rate low contrary 
to anchoring countries. For instance, France and the United Kingdom have had success in 
their strategy of devaluing their currency against the German Mark. These clearly indicated a 
trend in which France followed in 1987. At this time, the German inflation rate was 1% while 
France‘s was two percentage points higher; by 1992, France‘s inflation rate was 2%. The 
United Kingdom also experienced enormous success with this strategy; pegging to the 
German Mark in 1990 when her inflation rate was at 10% and by 1992, it had fallen to 2%, 
(Mishkin & Posen (1997), after abandoning the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
 
These periods marked milestones that resulted in speeding-up adjustment process of money 
supply, reduction of inflation rate as well as re-organization of other economic performances. 
Accordingly, the exchange rate strategy in place affects authority‘s accountability positively 
by clearly defining its goals, while it can influence the same accountability negatively if the 
economy is overheating (Blejer, & Šcreb, 1999, p.41). Similarly, Mishkin (1999a) states that 
                                                          
 
9
 However, majority of emerging market economies and low-income countries panic in floating their currencies 
against other foreign currencies this is because they lack credibility toward currency value Guillermo and 
Reinhart (2002). 
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the exchange rate regime may weaken financial sector and as a result cause financial crises. 
Hence, a continuous adherence of exchange rate regime is probable to have a far-reaching 
impact of economic sluggishness and exacerbate redundancy in the economy. 
 
2.3 Brief literature review of institutional alignment  
The literatures on IT-framework in both middle-income and upper-income levels countries 
have suggested that this monetary policy strategy is tenable if and only if some institutional 
preconditions are in place. One such precondition to the adoption and implementation of IT-
framework is Central Bank Independence. Indeed, Kydland and Prescott (1977) literature on 
the time-inconsistency theory in monetary and later extended by Barro and Gordon (1983) 
offers an intuitive message to most central bank around the globe. The idea behind this 
conjecture is that the economic agents such as private agents are rational in forming 
expectations about inflation that are higher than optimal level, whereas unemployment 
remains static. Rogoff, (1985) extend this dynamic inconsistency analogy and argue that a 
―conservative‖ and independent authority that emphasis on low inflation and output 
stabilization fundamentals is likely to command greater credibility in mitigating this problem 
of dynamic inconsistency. Most studies have vehemently metioned and differentiated variuos 
multifacets that could,arguably, give a definite definition of what constitute to central bank 
independence. In their work (Debelle and Fischer 2004) define goal independent as a joint 
decision between the authority and the government as embedded in the government 
legislations to set inflation targets in specifying price stability as the fundamental objective of 
monetary policy. That is, in a democratic system, the government has the tendency of 
retaining the possession of the monetary policy objective, that is, the authority is committal in 
setting inflation targets.  
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Instrument independence is the freedom of central bank in selecting appropriate monetary 
policy tools in order to achieve the stated policy objectives. However, this freedom requires 
an authority that command greater accountability in order to avoid situations where the 
central bank finances government deficit through printing more money. Indeed, where central 
bank is independent from government interference it is likely to insulate itself from political 
pressures to finance government fiscal deficits, which can result to over-expansionary 
monetary policies.
10
 The central bank should also exercise greater independence of either 
legal instruments or goal instruments, (Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti, 1992). While economic 
independence entails the capability of the central bank in determining the rules revolving 
around the lending policy of the government and the major supervisory measures instituted in 
the banking sector.  
 
The political independence emanates from political influence in appointments of the senior 
most personel of the aouthority and other overiding features such as primary objective of the 
authority, (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991); and Loungani and Sheets (1997)). 
However, the instrument independence is improved if there is continued interaction between 
the central bank and the government in key decision making regarding execution of the 
monetary policy conduct, (Obben 2006, pp. 3). 
Above all, a large body of studies has primarily focused on indices enshrined in most central 
bank‘s laws. Cukierman, (1994) and Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) have categorically 
contended that the CBI indices in majority of high income countries arise from central bank‘s 
laws interpretation and are of great concern to legal independence indicator, whereas, in 
developing countries de facto independence indicators form the main measure of Central 
Bank Independence. The argument is that low-income countries have weak rule of law 
                                                          
 
10
 See Debelle and Fischer (2004) 
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entrenched in their political customs and as a result, the legal central bank independence is 
not a good indicator of CBI in such countries but rather the de facto independence indicators 
(that is, turnover rate of central bank governors), (Mangano, 1998). In support to this 
proposition Cukierman(1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) in their work, report that TOR is a 
good indicator of CBI in developing countries, whereas, the legal CBI forms a better proxy of 
CBI in industrial countries.   
 
The assumption on TOR is that, the frequency at which the central bank governor removal 
from office is inversely associated with the level of central bank independence. This 
association as exhibited by the work of Dreher, et al.( 2007) and Cukierman(1992) who finds 
a robust inverse relationship between TOR and inflation in developing countries. However, 
De Haan and Kooi (2000) find a strong relationship between inflation and TOR after 
including countries with high inflation rate in their sample. In other words, the causal 
relationship between inflation and TOR may arise from other inflationary shocks due to past 
crisis and public preferance for either a more goal oriented central bank or a more 
independent authority free from any political interferences (De Sousa, 2001). Therefore, 
causal effect is only way link that emanate from inflation to TOR, (Dreher, Sturm & De Haan, 
2007). 
 
Studies of Cukierman et al. (1992) states that the average and variance of inflation has a 
negative correlation to governor‘s turnover rate in most of the developing countries. This is 
because most studies have expressed doubts over the reliability of most of indicators used to 
construct Central Bank Independence indices. Indeed, there exists a greater divergence when 
it comes to categorization of indicators used to measure CBI incase of high income countries, 
emerging countries and low-income countries. After instituting control for foreign inflation, 
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crisis emanating from banks, and exchange rate framework, Jácome and Vázquez (2005) 
finds a negative link between CBI and Inflation resulting from structural reforms in Latin 
America.  
 
Dreher et al. (2010) used a data set comprising of eighty-eight countries‘ term of office of 
central banks governors since 1975-2005. They used logit model to test the likelihood of 
central bank governor‘s tenure geting terminated before their legal term in office expires. 
According to their results, the probability of a TOR as a measure of CBI tend to soar under 
certain conditions which includes: unstable political system, undue elapse of governor term 
of service in office and during elections period in self-governing countries. Accordingly, they 
indicated in their hypothesis that there was a higher chance of the governors getting replaced 
if there was huge drop out of veto players from the government.  
 
Cukierman et al. (1992) have developed legal independence indices focusing on the extent of 
the autonomy and reliance to the legal element of the authoriy in conducting monetary policy  
that is free from any external interfereneces. The results for legal independence index are    
significant in ascertaining inflation rate in developed economies and insignificant in Low- 
income or emerging countries. Under this measure of CBI, they concentrated on such areas 
such as the governor of the bank, policy formulation, the objectives of the central bank, and 
the lending practices. However, Ja'come and Va'zquez (2005) extends Cukierman et al (1992) 
legal independence indices by adding new indicators, which are, the degree of exchange rate 
conduct by the authority; the rules governing the lender of the last resort; and accountability 
and transparency legal requirements.  
 
Actual turnover rate of governors forms a better turning point of inflation determination in 
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developing countries. Cukierman et al (1992) argues that in cases where governor legal term 
of office is shorter than that of government there are chances the CBI will be compromised 
by the government, thereby, resulting to increased turnover rate of governor. More over, the 
governor is likely to be susceptible to government influence thereby derailing long-term 
objective of policy formation and implementation under the pretext of political pressure 
especially during election periods. They gave an example of Argentina where the legal term 
of office of the governor is four years but the actual term of office is one year because the 
governor has either resigned at will or his/her term get terminated once the government or 
Finance Minister changes. They went further with their research and administered 
questionnaires to the personnel of various central banks (twenty three in total). 
 
Kuttner and Posen, (2010), takes the same direction and indicate that undue appointment of 
governor in office result to construed information to the authority in meeting its goal of price 
stability. For instance, unjustifiable appointment of governor under low inflation periods may 
reinforce the exchange rate, while the opposite is always true. Given that governor‘s 
appointment seem to contain valuable information regarding the exchange rate and inflation 
rate. Gutierrez, (2003) point out that CBI has a positive impact in  reducing the chances of 
governments incurring budget deficits through quasi-fiscal activities. In that, such activities 
can be understood on their inflationary impacts. The effect of legal appointment of governor 
to office determines the scope to which markets observe that the next governor will bring a 
swing in policy stance, in that, the governor is expected to determine the bearing of such 
swing, Posen and Kuttner (2010). This is also in conformity with the fact that, the news 
conveyed may favor either one side due to markets‘ reaction after such appointment.  
  
Preconditions for Adopting Inflation Targeting Framework: An Empirical Evidence for Small Economies 
20 
 
Another important prerequisite for successful IT-framework stressed by the literature is a 
healthy financial and banking system. A sound financial system is essential to guarantee an 
efficient transmission mechanism of monetary policy (interest rate channel) and more 
specifically forms an enabling environment of smooth exchange and provision of credit. In 
support to these, Lucotte, (2010) suggest that the authority should have a credible financial 
system for an effective monetary policy transmission mechanism and a sound financial 
intermediation. In contrast, a weak banking sector is potentially problematic to achieve 
inflation target, especially in the short-run where central bank tend to relax its stance of 
raising interest rates since it might depress commercial banks profits leading to downfall of 
financial system.  
 
Inadequate domestic capital markets and the resulting effect of a domestic currency 
dollarization make the financial system more vulnerable to domestic currency depreciating by 
reducing the net worth of borrowers through a balance sheets effect. As outlined in Woo 
(2003), a well-developed domestic capital market enables the public treasury to diversify its 
sources of funds (e.g. by issuing bonds), and by reducing incentive to finance public deficits 
through inflation. Moreover, Cukierman (1992) argues that the degree of financial depth has 
positive correlation with the level of CBI, that is, broad financial markets are more likely to 
grant their central bank more independence in order to avoid potential disruptions in the 
process of financial intermediation. Mishkin, (2004) declared that unhealthy financial system 
can result to problems in case of embracing the IT-framework since central bank tend to raise 
interest in the short-term for fear of collapse of financial systems. He also argues that 
exchange rate sharply depreciate due to huge capital outflow thus exacerbating upward 
pressure on the inflation rate. 
The work by Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) shows a positive relationship between party 
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political instability and CBI. Their results indicate scenarios where current politicians in 
office anticipates a greater downfall in the next election and instead they tend to delegate 
power to authority to restrain the future government, thus restricts the range of policy actions 
available. Similarly, according to findings of Cukierman (1992) where political institutions 
are fully established and stable central bank also tend to be more independent. The results 
showed that political parties‘ stabilities have a positive relation with CBI, whereas a high-
level political party instability has a negative relationship with CBI. The political arena is of 
greater importance in arriving to the conclusion as to why most countries experiencing high     
inflation have also high level of political instability. The exposition to this is the main 
contribution of political institutions in strengthening and supporting the democratic space in 
terms of political participation, democracy, accountability and openness in government.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper will focus more specifically on various institutional arrangements focusing 
primarily on the central bank autonomy, financial institutions, fiscal position, political 
institutions and also macro-economic variables. Given the effect of IT-Framework toward 
inflation, it is important to note that, most of the emerging economies that have already 
anchored their monetary strategy using this framework have a very short experience with 
regard to its implementation; therefore, the analysis will focus on those countries with over 
three years of operational experience by the end of 2010. Similarly, since the data used in this 
paper is largely secondary data it varies greatly due to various factors associated to country 
specific, for example, political upheavals that may have derailed data collection as witnessed 
in most African countries; re-organization and resurgence of governments from former 
regimes this is mainly the case in former Soviet Union countries which disintegrated in the 
1990‘s.  
3.1 Data coverage and sources  
The panel dataset covers sample of low-income levels and upper income-levels (emerging 
markets) countries
11
 comprised of both inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters since 
1990 to 2009. However, the countries sample size chosen is heterogeneous because these 
countries are dynamic in the way they are classified.
12
 Next, I include countries with a 
population greater than one million and real GDP per capita equal or greater than one 
thousand dollars on annual basis (all based on 2010 dataset of IMF) and almost the same size 
                                                          
 
11
 Low-Income and Upper Income-level country classifications is according to World Bank countries income 
levels classifications  
12
 Heterogeneity in the sense that countries such as South Korea, Czech Republic, and Israel are in the same 
level of macroeconomic performance with high income countries yet they fall under emerging markets category.   
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with Kenya economy. Moreover, the rationale of data selection is on the need to ascertain the 
success of the framework (fully or partially adopted) since the first emerging country 
anchored its monetary policy in early1991, as well as capturing small economies.
13
  
 
Conversely, the inflation targeting countries samples are drawn from Leyva (2008) and 
consist of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, and 
Turkey. While, part of the control group (non- inflation targeting countries) sample as 
described by (Gonçalves and Salles 2008) consists of such countries such as: Algeria, 
Argentina, Bolivia, China, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Honduras, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Paraguay, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia. The table below 
shows the inflation targeting countries assessed in this paper, which are fourteen emerging 
economies and five low-income countries; the date they adopted the IT-framework, and the 
corresponding description of inflation target levels. 
  
                                                          
 
13
 Data sources: 
The datasets are drawn from institutions such as, International Financial Statistics-International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank-World Development Indicators (WDI), and Polity IV Project (polity2) databases. Central Bank‘s 
various Legislations, legal Independence and Governor‘s Turnover Rate data sets are derived from various 
databases of Eijffinger and De Haan (1996);Cukierman et al. (1992); Crowe and Meade (2007) databases; and 
country specific central bank‘s websites. 
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Table 1: Inflation targeting countries 
Country Pre-
targeting 
dates 
Post-
targeting 
dates 
Numerical 
inflation 
target 
Former 
Regimes 
Commit 
to 
inflation   
Exchange rate 
regime 
Chile 1991 2000 3  1%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Israel  1992 1997 2  1%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Exchange rate 
(crawling bands)  
Peru  1994 2002 2  1%) Monetary 
aggregates 
No  Independent 
floating 
Czech  
Republic 
1998 1998 3  1%) Dual 
regime 
Yes  Managed float 
South  
Korea 
1998 1998 3  1%) Monetary 
aggregates 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Brazil 1999 1999 4.5  2%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Mexico  1999 2001 3.5  1%) Monetary 
aggregates 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Poland  1999 1999 2.5  1%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Colombia 2000 2000 2-4(%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
South  
Africa  
2000 2000 3-6(%) Monetary 
aggregates 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Hungary  2001 2001 3  1%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Exchange rate 
within crawling 
bands 
Philippines  2002 2002 4.5  1%) Dual 
regime 
No  Independent 
floating 
Thailand 2000 2000 0.5-3(%) Monetary 
aggregates 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Guatemala  2005 2005 5  1%) Monetary 
aggregates 
No Managed float 
Indonesia  2005 2005 4-6(%) Monetary 
aggregates 
No  Independent 
floating 
Romania  2005 2005 3.5  1%) Monetary 
aggregates 
No  Managed floating 
Turkey  2001 2006 6.5  2%) Exchange 
rate target 
Yes  Independent 
floating 
Ghana 2007 2007 14.5  1%) Monetary 
aggregates 
No  Managed floating 
Sources: Authors collection based on Levya (2008), Roger, (2010), and country-specific 
central bank websites.  
i. Inflation targets alongside deviation bands are as of 2009. 
3.2 Variable specification 
The endogenous variable equals to one if a country specific has formally adopted IT-
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framework at time t, and zero if absent. However, the presumption of ―half year rule‖ (Leyva, 
2008) will be the guiding principle in choosing the actual year of IT-framework as a formal 
monetary strategy for inflation targeting countries. That is, I acknowledge the first six months 
of the year as the actual year of IT-framework adoption, while the other portion of six months 
are selected in the year that follows and therefore recognized as the year of IT-framework 
adoption.
14
 
 
The exogenous variables comprising of aforementioned preconditions are as follows and 
there summary statistic are indicated in Table 4: First, institutional indicators have been 
highly used by various scholars and countries targeting inflation in determining the 
preference or probability of shifting their former monetary stance to IT-framework. The 
variables of importance are in four broad indicators that are:   
 
Central Bank Independence Indices proxy of both legal independence and governor‘s 
turnover rate indices forms the first institutional indicator of interest. This paper relies on the 
indices of Cukierman et al. (1992), Crowe and Meade (2007); Kuttner and Posen (2001); 
Grilli et al, (1992) but takes a different approach since my interest transcends to impact of the 
Legal CBI index toward IT-framework adoption. I use there more or less methodology of 
arriving at the legal independence index by constructing a dummy variable of Legal CBI 
guided by the following four broad questions constructed by Cukierman et al. (1992) first 
question revolves around the authority‘s primary objective(=1 if price stability is the primary 
objective, zero otherwise. Second question revolves around the senior most personnel‘s of the 
central bank appointment and tenure of service in office(=1 if appointment is done by highly 
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 See the work reported by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Kuttner and Posen (2001) slightly differs in 
what constitute the actual year and dates of IT-framework adoption in Peru.  
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rank central bank officials, zero otherwise.
15
 Next, rest on the formulation and 
implementation of the monetary policy(=1 if the central bank formulates and implement 
inflation targets independently and set monetary policy independently, zero otherwise. And 
last one rest on the authority‘s lending policy(=1 if government does not finance government 
fiscal budgets, zero otherwise. The overall measure is then scaled accordingly and the 
average mean score is used to arrive at Legal CBI dummy variable (LCBI). This variable is 
expected to have positive association with IT-framework. The other measure of central bank 
independence is the turnover rate of central bank Governors (TOR), which has an inverse 
relationship with inflation. Accordingly, the presumption is that, a high turnover rate indicates 
fragile authority sovereignty. Since this measure of central bank independence, is of great 
importance, the Cukierman et al.(1992) and Crowe and Meade (2007) derivation of the TOR 
data since 1990-2003. Arguably, I extend the variable after 2003 for the remaining years of 
estimation. 
Political stability variable forms a larger part in determining the probability of countries 
anchoring their inflation rate in a more democratic environment, and in particular, the low-
income countries where democracy is highly undermined by few political elite.
16
 I use 
polity2 index from databases of Marshall and Jaggers (2010) to measure political stability. 
The corresponding (polity2) coefficients measure the overall influence of democratic score 
towards adopting IT-framework. 
The exchange rate regime forms the third institutional indicator variable. Many proponent of 
international finance have classified exchange rate regime into two segments: First, ―de jure‖ 
exchange rate (according to law) that captures central bank‘s official commitment to policy. 
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 Note the senior most personnel‘s refers to the Central Bank Governor and Her/his deputy governor  
16
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) have constructed a dataset called Polity IV project to measure institutional 
political stability using databases of (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). They have gone further to deduct Democratic 
score from Autocratic Score in order to arrive at polity2 index, where it ranges from +10 (very strong) 
democratic score to -10(very strong) autocratic score.  
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Nonetheless, it requires proper mechanism for actual policy control for implementation to be 
effective. Second, the ―de facto‖ exchange rate arrangement (by existence) monitors the 
exchange rate movement; however, it also lacks the intended compositional characteristics.  
 
All member states under the World Bank and the IMF umbrella uses floating exchange rate 
or fixed exchange rate regimes as there official nominal anchor for monetary policy strategy. 
Indeed, the IMF (2010) has classified the exchange rate regime into nine categories and 
further re-classified the same into:
17
 First, floating exchange rate system, which could be 
either free or managed floating system. Next, an intermediate exchange system, that is, it 
could be either pegged, crawling or a band arrangement system and; fixed exchange rate 
system- hard peg or currency board. The rationale is on whether the exchange rate system in 
place is plausible towards country specific shifting to another monetary policy strategy. The 
―de jure‖ exchange rate arrangement dummy(FLXTR) will equal to one if a country has a 
floating exchange system in place and equals to zero if floating exchange system is absent. 
 
Macro-economic Structure variables 
The Financial Development indicators- a well-developed financial base is reasonable for 
countries forging the way forward in case of adopting this strategy since it gives authority 
credibility to meet their intended objectives. Although, there are many indicators used in the 
past to test financial depth of various countries-broad money growth, money and quasi 
money(GM2), liquid liabilities to GDP (LLGDP), domestic private credit percentage of 
GDP(DPCGDP), central bank assets to GDP(CBAGDP) and private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP (PCDMB) are highly associated with IT-framework adoption. Thus, the 
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 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) have classified exchange rate into fine classification comprising of numbers 
ranging from one(less flexible) to fourteen (less rigid). 
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presumption is that a strong financial depth provides high probability of countries adopting 
this framework. Similarly, trade openness (OPENC), forms an alternative to evaluate the 
extent of exposure to external shocks. This is because it has a direct relationship with the 
exchange rate system; predetermined exchange rate makes a country to be vulnerable to 
external shocks due to pressure of sustaining such regime. The expected sign for this variable 
is supposed to be negative.
18
 
 
Moreover, a weak fiscal position is a major shortcoming of many low-income countries 
toward switching to IT-framework. This is because their governments normally finance their 
huge deficit through seigniorage revenues. Therefore, the presumption is that, countries that 
are highly characterized by government fiscal imbalances have low levels of reliability and 
lack of credibility of keeping inflation at low levels. Hence, current account relative to GDP 
(CAGDP) measures the extent of fiscal dominance and external government debt to nominal 
GDP (DEBT) in order to draw conclusion of my hypothesis. The control variables will 
include the log of real GDP per capita (LNRGDP), and normalized inflation rate 
(INFL_N).
19
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
This paper aims to depict a logit model of estimation in order to arrive at a conclusive 
evidence of the aforementioned preconditions necessary before countries shifts their 
monetary stance by anchoring their inflation to a predetermined target range or band. 
Nevertheless, the logit model is suitable if the response variable takes a value of (=1 if IT-
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 Trade openness is the ratio of sum of exports and imports to nominal GDP, all at current US dollars.                                   
19
The normalized inflation given as                   is important in controlling hyperinflation episodes 
and in avoiding a potential simultaneity between IT-framework and inflation level. 
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framework is present, zero if IT-framework is absent). The type of research question that I 
will seek to address in this section is the extent to which the relationship between IT-
framework and inflation is influenced by aforementioned preconditions and that the 
authorities prefers IT-framework than any other monetary policy regime. Then, I will display 
the likelihood test for testing my hypotheses that also captures the marginal effects of the 
selected preconditions.  
 
4.1 Logit model derivation 
The work of Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Agresti (2003), and Pregibon (1981) has covered 
categorical models in details. However, I compare and contrast the Logit model alongside 
other commonly used models for estimating categorical models. More precisely, the Linear 
Probability Model (henceforth, LPM) and Probit model
20
 are widely used in the analysis of 
categorical data where the dependent variable is dichotomous in nature. As an example, the 
depiction of LPM expressed in the form of a linear equation is give below: 
Πi =Þ(Y=1|Xi) = β0+β1Xi……………………………………………….. …………………….(i) 
Where the Y is the response variable (IT-framework = one, zero otherwise), while X is the 
predictor variables under consideration. LPM is disadvantageous in two ways: First, it is 
unreasonable to assume that Πi =Þ(Y=1|Xi) is an increasing factor of X, that is, the marginal 
effect of X remains constant. Second, the LPM assumes the variance of Πi =Þ(Y=1|Xi) is 
constant across values of X, (Homoscedasticity), so that as Πi approaches 1or zero, the 
corresponding variance approaches zero, hence heteroscedasticity variances of the 
disturbance term. The other serious problem with this form of estimating binary choice 
models is that the response variable, Πi =Þ(Y=1|Xi) on the left-hand side can only take two 
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Logit and Probit model are almost the same since they yield the same results. However, the difference arises in 
the distribution. Logit reports Cumulative Standards Logistic distribution, whereas Probit model reports 
Cumulative Standard Normal distribution (Φ) and ɀi function is the index of the Probit model i.e. Probit model 
is given by, ɀi=β0+β1Xi; Πi =E(Y=1|Xi) = Φ (β0+β1Xi) and ɀi=β0+β1Xi , (Cameron and Trivedi ,2005 pp.466) 
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values [1,0], while the linear parameters on the right-hand side (RHS) can assume values 
ranging from negative infinity to positive infinity thus making LPM untenable. Therefore, it 
is appropriate to transform the probability (Πi) by eliminating [1, 0] restriction. In order to do 
this; I will evaluate a nonlinear functional form of estimation that satisfies the following 
assumptions. i) X increases Πi =Þ(Y=1|Xi) within the range of [1, 0] and does not go to the 
extreme values. ii) and the non-linearity association between Πi and Xi holds, such that Πi 
=Þ(Y=1|Xi) to be increasing in Xi for (β1>0), (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005 pp.471). Since Logit 
model reports Cumulative standards logistic distribution function, it follows that:  
ɀi=β0+β1Xi: 
Πi =Þ(Y=1|Xi) = (β0+β1Xi)……………………………………………………………. (ii) 
Therefore, eq. (ii) transformed results to eq. (iii);  
Π              
 
             
 
 
    
……………………………………. ....... (iii) 
Consequently, ɀi assumes a negative infinity (-∞) to positive infinity (+∞); while Πi ranges 
between [1, 0]; and that there is no linear relationship between Πi and ɀi (e.g. Xi). Hence, 
under this threshold the LPM both conditions are satisfied. This means that we cannot use 
LPM in estimating the explanatory variables under consideration since Πi is nonlinear to both 
Xi and β. 
4.2. Logit model estimation 
Thus, the overall Logit distribution function and the likelihood of a country adopting IT-
framework over time t is derived from eq. (i) and eq. (ii) respectively:   
                 
 
    
 
     
       
                          
On the other hand, eq. (v) is the probability of a country not adopting IT-framework over time 
t given as: 
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Where, eq. (iv) and eq. (v) yields 
 
    
 which is the odds ratio in support of countries 
adopting IT-framework- the ratio of the probability of adopting IT-framework against the 
probability of not adopting IT-framework. After transforming the odds ratio into natural logs, 
it is obvious the log odds ratio has a linear relation to Xt-1 as well as to the parameters β under 
estimation. In this case, parameter β measures a change in the log-odds ratio for a unit change 
in Xt-1. The Logit model indicating the log of the odds ratio estimation as a linear function of 
the predictor variables is derived from eq. (iv) and eq. (v): 
  
              
              
                                    
Estimation of the Logit model requires information regarding the values of Xt-1 and Lt. 
21
 
Therefore, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the model parameter is widely used 
in logistic estimation (Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pp.467) and (Agresti 2003)).
22
 Indeed, to 
test the hypotheses, that is, the null and alternative hypotheses and the log ratio of the 
maximum likelihood of the two hypotheses are related asymptotically to the chi-square 
distribution, I maximize the logistic function to give the log likelihood ratio verified as,  
                           
     
     
 
                                                          
 
21
 Hence, LPM becomes invalid in such scenarios where we are dealing with data resulting from individual or 
group variables. 
22
 The marginal effect model is given by:  
                                  
               
     
             
The above partial derivative bring us to marginal effect of     on the dichotomous variable ITt that is given as, 
               
     
 
In order to derive the marginal effect, there is a need to multiply β estimate by the density of ɛ  that differ with 
the level of X. (Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pp.467). 
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4.3 Estimation results 
In this paper, I use Levya, (2008) methodology of differentiating between the two sub-periods 
(Pre-targeting and Post-targeting dates) of IT-framework adoption as shown in Table 1. Thus, 
my estimates revolve around these two sub-periods of IT-framework adoption for inflation 
targeting countries. On the contrary, the periods between 1990-2009 and 1997-2009 forms the 
selection periods for non-inflation targeting countries.  
4.4 Tests for Model specification errors and multicollinearity  
In testing for the model specification errors, the linearly predicted values are significant 
predictor for the model, whereas, the squares of linearly predicted values are insignificant, 
table 2 portrays the corresponding p-values. This means that the preconditions variables 
under investigation are influential predictor for the likelihood of adopting IT-framework. 
Similarly, the likelihood chi2‘s and pseudo-R2 reported in table 2 indicates all models under 
investigations as a whole fits significantly better than empty models.
23
 However, the 
disadvantage of the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) goodness of fit results need greater 
precision in interpretation in order to leave no room for doubts, hence, need to go further and 
estimate the model for any other misspecifications. Therefore, in curbing the problem of 
multicollinearity, I use both the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Level to test 
any instances of the correlation between the variables themselves ad to avoid any biasness in 
estimations. Accordingly, the mean VIFs for all corresponding estimations have the right 
values of one.
24
 That is, the tolerance does not go to a value of less than one in all 
estimations, while none of the VIFs goes to extremes of more than ten. “See Table 2”  
                                                          
 
23
 The goodness of fit proposed by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) is statistically insignificant for all models in 
Table 2 indicating the models are well fit for investigations.  
24
 See Long and Freese (2006) 
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4.5 Summary Statistics  
The summary statistics reported in Table 4 comprise all variables under estimation. Table 4 
indicates that the LCBI has a slight magnitude effect in these countries, especially, in non-
inflation targeting countries. The governor TOR is significantly important in non-inflation 
targeting countries than in post inflation-targeting period, where on average it is higher in 
non-inflation targeting countries (0.32) than in the inflation targeting ones (0.25). Flexible 
exchange rate is favorable in inflation targeting countries than in non-inflation targeting ones.  
 
The overall financial development on average, has improved tremendously in inflation 
targeting countries than in their counterpart non-targeters, indicating formidable development 
in financial systems. The fiscal position is highly weakened by huge government‘s deficits 
and external debts in both countries though seem to improve greatly in inflation targeting 
countries. The macroeconomic performance: log of real GDP per capita measures the 
variation of the country‘s extent of economic activities and increases on average of 7.42 (non-
targeters) to 8.18 (inflation targeting countries) though the difference is minimal between 
them. On the other hand, the normalized inflation rate is higher in inflation targeting 
countries (0.17) than in inflation targeting countries (0.14), this is contrary to the presumption 
of IT-framework adoption in countries experiencing disinflation. However, this difference can 
be because of various economic shocks experienced during the post inflation-targeting period.  
4.6 Interpretation of the findings  
Table 2 shows the logit estimation results for low-incomes and emerging economies. In 
Model 1 and Model 1, the results are inclusive of hyperinflation periods. While, Model 3 and 
Model 4 the results are for periods with less than 50% inflation rate. However, the results 
reported in both tables are slightly different from each other with almost similar coefficients 
and significant levels. Similarly, all the preconditions necessary for IT-framework adoption 
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exhibit the expected sign as hypothesized in Table 3, although some are statistically 
significant and others are not. This overall result indicates that real GDP per capita, declining 
inflation rate, floating exchange rate regime, trade openness, and fiscal position are 
considerable determinants for IT-framework adoption.  
 
On the individual variable specification reported in Table 2 and Table 3: The economic 
performance measured by the log of real GDP per capita is highly significant and positively 
related to IT-framework in all models of estimation. This clearly indicates the significance 
attached to the output levels in determining the likelihood of countries shifting to IT-
framework, that is, one point increase in log of GDP per capita, increases the log-odds of 
adopting IT-framework by coefficients reported in Model 1 to Model 3. However, in Model 
(1)-(3) real GDP per capita has improve less than in Model (2)-(4), which are inclusive of the 
debt component and financial development indicators. This is in conformity with Debelle 
(1997) who state that ―output should always feature in the reaction function of the central 
bank‖ meaning that output levels have a greater effect in forecasting expected inflation. 
Similarly, inflation has an inverse relationship and significant as indicated by the coefficients 
though fail to produce robust results. Arguably, countries reporting low inflation rates stand a 
high chance of adopting IT-framework. Trade openess has a negative sign (Table 3) and is 
statistically significant in all model of estimation in Table 2. Similarly, in Model (1)-(3) the 
results are highly robust due to exclusion of debt component from estimation. Thus, leading 
to the conclusion that country differs in the magnitude of debt levels. Conversely, the 
inclusion of broad money growth in Model 2 of Table 2 has a direct relationship with the 
degree of openness. Romer, 1993) argues that increasing money growth causes depreciation 
of exchange rate in an open economy leading to overheating of the economy. Due to high 
correlation for broad money growth with various financial development indicators the 
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variable is drop in the subsequent estimations. 
 
The floating exchange rate dummy is statistically significant and positively related to IT-
framework dummy throughout the estimation period, thus the presumption of the importance 
attached towards flexible exchange rate and likelihood of embracing IT-framework is tenable. 
It should be noted that most developing countries exchange rate regime though freely 
determined by forces of demand and supply (for floating countries) majority of these 
governments tend to intervene in determinination of exchange rate in order to maintain 
exchange rate steadiness. As noted by Rose ( 2007) that ―Inflation targeters let their exchange 
rates float, usually without controls on capital flows and often without intervention.‖ 
 
The TOR as the measure of central bank independence is statistically significant and 
negatively associated with the IT-framework adoption in all models of estimation, with a 
greater reduction of turnover rate of central banks governors in post-inflation targeting in 
Model having with a coefficient of (-3.64). This is in agreement with most of literatures on 
CBI such as, Dreher, et al.( 2007) and Cukierman(1992). However, the results differs with De 
Haan and Kooi (2000) who finds a strong relationship between inflation and TOR after 
including countries with high inflation rate in their sample, unlike the robustness results 
reported in Model 4 in a sample of low inflation countries. On the otherhand, LCBI though 
positively related to IT-framework is not a good measure of central bank independence in 
low-income and emerging countries as it not statistically different from zero. Indeed, the 
Polity2 indicator for political stability has the expected sign and is statistically significant 
throughout the estimation period. Hence indicating that countries need to have stable political 
environment before they switch there monetary policy‘s regimes. Financial development 
indicators illustrated by: BMG, LLGDP, and PCDB are not statistically important in all levels 
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of estimations, while both CBAGDP and PCDMB are not significant in Model 3 but after re-
estimation CBAGDP is weakly significant at 0.01 level of confidence and PCDMB is robust 
in Model 4 with t-statistic of 3.58. Fiscal position (Debt and CAGDP) though negatively 
related with IT-framework are insignificant at all models of estimation.  
   
4.6 Marginal effects of Logit estimation  
Table 5 reports the marginal effects at the mean value of independent variables. The predicted 
likelihood of adopting IT-framework by various countries is 0.063, 0.114, 0.076, and 0.124 
respectively. For instance, in Model 1 one point decrease in inflation increases the probability 
countries with inflation that decrease at an average of 11 percent and every additional 
increase in real GDP per capita increases the probability by 77%. On the other hand, trade 
openness has a high degree of marginal effect. The marginal effects of financial development 
are negligible, while political stability variables are marginally significant with IT-framework 
adoption.  
 
CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
The main analysis of this study has exhausted major avenues that have led to many countries 
shifting their former monetary strategy to IT-framework paying attention to emerging markets 
and low-income countries. The result indicates that countries characterized by low inflation 
rates stand a high chance of adopting IT-framework. The fiscal surplus measured by the 
current account to nominal GDP ratio impact negatively (though not significant) in 
determining countries shifting to IT-framework indicates that non-inflation targeting 
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countries need to have a sound fiscal balance that can ameliorate instances of high inflation 
shocks resulting from high interest rates and tightening of monetary policy. Moreover, 
countries characterized by improved macroeconomic performance and stronger institutional 
developments have a high chance of switching to IT-framework.  
 
The results also suggest that, overall, institutional development though necessary is not an 
important prerequisite in the initial periods of IT-framework adoption. Central bank 
independence measured by TOR affect negatively the choice of moving to IT-framework. 
This means that high turnover rate of central bank governor results to low credibility and 
accountability in the conduct of monetary policy and that the public may lack confidence 
with the authority. Similarly, financial depth is one of the indicators of financial development 
of a country hence it is clear that, countries need to have strong financial institutions before 
switching to this framework once again not a prerequisite in prior to IT-framework adoption. 
The Log of GDP per capita and floating exchange rate are highly associated with the choice 
of inflation. In conclusion, the decision to forge towards IT-framework requires resolute 
efforts and support in addressing the main drawbacks that may hinder successful 
implementation of IT-framework especially on the technical aspects and capability of most of 
low-income and emerging countries, which are limited or lacking. The technical aspects in 
this case involve the modalities or indices used to measure inflation (majority of countries use 
consumer price index), the quality and timely data collection and the expertise that are well 
knowledgeable about the monetary policy.   
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APPENDICES 
Table 2: Logit Estimation Results 
 (A) (B)    (C)                 (D) 
   Inflation<50% 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL4 
OPENC -0.0134
***
 -0.0202
***
 -0.0118
**
 -0.0176
***
 
 (-4.78) (-4.49) (-3.09) (-3.53) 
CAGDP -0.230 -0.372   
 (-0.40) (-0.57)   
FLXTR 1.910
***
 1.901
***
 1.874
***
 2.257
***
 
 (4.90) (4.15) (4.65) (4.15) 
POLITY2 0.164
***
 0.194
***
 0.157
***
 0.172
**
 
 (4.42) (3.78) (4.06) (3.29) 
TOR -4.448
***
 -4.714
***
 -4.093
***
 -3.639
**
 
 (-4.82) (-3.95) (-4.31) (-2.91) 
LNRGDP 1.471
***
 1.996
***
 1.303
***
 1.809
***
 
 (8.60) (6.81) (7.16) (6.03) 
INFL_N -14.35
***
 -19.98
***
 -14.31
***
 -20.81
***
 
 (-5.57) (-3.62) (-4.55) (-3.30) 
DPCGDP  0.0130   
  (1.38)   
BMG  0.00831   
  (0.65)   
DEBT  -0.00547   
  (-0.78)   
LCBI  0.549  0.816 
  (1.31)  (1.78) 
CBAGDP   -2.822 -9.734
**
 
   (-1.39) (-2.74) 
LLGDP   -1.761 -3.464 
   (-1.35) (-1.86) 
PCDMB   1.832 5.350
***
 
   (1.88) (3.58) 
CONSTANT -12.74
***
 -17.21
***
 -11.40
***
 -16.21
***
 
 (-9.17) (-6.96) (-7.62) (-6.47) 
LR chi2 (df_m) 336.4 (7) 299.9 (11) 304.8 (9) 293.0 (10) 
r2_p 0.435 0.546 0.423 0.564 
N 
Mean VIF 
Specification errors 
HLchi2  
809 
1.29 
0.000(0.33) 
8.34(0.40) 
488 
1.95 
0.000(0.87) 
7.30(0.50) 
708 
2.37 
0.000(0.99) 
8.05(0.43) 
449 
2.58  
0.000(0.95) 
7.95(0.44) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
1. Letter A and C are coefficients for pre-inflation targeting framework, while Letter B and D are coefficients 
for post-inflation targeting framework. 
2. LR chi2 (df_m)-Log likelihood chi2; r2_p- Pseudo-R2; df_m; N- number of observations, HLchi2-Hosmer-
Lemeshow chi2 
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 Appendix 1B 
Table 3: Hypothesis Estimation Results 
SIGNS 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 
OPENC - - - - 
CAGDP - -   
FLXTR + + + + 
POLITY2 + + + + 
TOR - - - - 
LNRGDP + + + + 
INFL_N - - - - 
DPCGDP  +   
BMG  +   
DEBT  -   
LCBI  +  + 
CBAGDP   - - 
LLGDP   - - 
PCDMB   + + 
CONSTANT - - - - 
N 809 488 708 449 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
           Combined countries   Non-targeters 
Countries 
Targeters 
Countries  
Variables Mean  Max  Min  Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
Fiscal Position indicator 
CAGDP -0.010  1.36 -2.18 -0.01 0.242 -2.18 -0.01  1.36 -1.54 
DEBT 68.15 1209 2.02 80.09 1209 2.99 48.56 447.1  2.02 
Financial Development          
BMG  44.56 159.4 6.16 46.55 159.4 6.16 41.29 113.16  9.68 
DPCGDP 40.06 165.7 1.54 37.91 158.5 2.99 43.68 165.72  1.54 
LLGDP 0.44 1.30 0.05 0.46 1.30 0.05 0.40 1.14  0.06 
PCDMB  0.43 1.74 0.01 0.41 1.64 0.04 0.45 1.74  0.01 
GM2 65.86 12513 -100 67.98 12513 -100 62.38 6384.9 -29.82 
CBAGDP 0.10 1.74 0.00 0.11 0.72 0.000 0.09 0.86   0 
Political Stability           
POLITY2  3.35  10  -10 2.52 10  -10 4.70  10  -9 
Macroeconomic structure          
INFL_N  0.13       0.99 -0.08 0.12 0.99 -0.99 0.15 0.99 -0.01 
FLXTR  0.63    1  0 0.52 1   0 0.81 1 0 
LNRGDP  7.69 10.32 5.42 7.41 10.32 5.42 8.14  9.88  5.74 
OPENC 73.51 453.4 6.32 81.56 453.4 11.52 60.28 162.7  6.32 
CBI Indices 
TOR  0.29 1 0  0.31 1 0 0.24 0.8 0 
LCBI  0.40 1 0  0.41 1 0 0.40 1 0 
No of countries 43 25 18 
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Table 5: Macroeconomics Performance and Financial Development 
Indicators 
 (A) (B) (C) (D)     
 MARGINAL COEFFICIENTS     
   Inflation<50%     
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 XA XB XC XD 
OPENC -0.00119*** -0.0021*** -0.0014*** -0.00227*** 76.85 86.98 78.37 87.47 
 (-4.28) (-4.33) (-4.50) (-4.46)     
CAGDP 0.0008  -0.0013  -0.01  -0.01  
 (0.02)  (-0.03)      
CBAGDP -0.1848  -0.2055  0.08  0.08  
 (-1.79)  (-1.66)      
PCDB -0.0006 0.0016* -0.0006 0.00171* 41.11 43.92 41.89 44.28 
 (-1.51) (2.09) (-1.40) (2.11)     
BMG 0.0004  0.0005  46.72  47.78  
 (0.63)  (0.54)      
PDBGDP 0.1023  0.1171  0.45  0.46  
 (1.46)  (1.39)      
POLITY2 0.0108*** 0.1674*** 0.0130*** 0.0181*** 5.14 5.59 5.08 5.59 
 (4.78) (3.35) (5.08) (3.39)     
TOR -0.2782***  -0.3382***  0.27  0.27  
 (-4.86)  (-5.03)      
LNRGDP 0.0790*** 0.1844*** 0.0951*** 0.199*** 7.77 7.88 7.77 7.89 
 (5.50) (5.95) (5.97) (6.23)     
INFL_N -0.7030*** -1.4894*** -0.9497*** -1.579** 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07 
 (-4.85) (-3.34) (-4.35)     (-3.06)     
LLGDP  0.0346  0.0377  0.50  .050 
  (0.34)  (0.34)     
GM2  -0.0027  -0.0030  15.35  14.81 
  (-1.65)  (-1.65)     
XMFX_Y 
N 
0.063 
749 
  0.114 
  440 
  0.076 
   707 
0.124 
 432 
Note: Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001; (d) for discrete change of dummy 
variable from 0 to 1 
1. Letter A and C are coefficients for pre-inflation targeting framework, while Letter B and D are coefficients for post-
inflation targeting framework respectively. 
2. Letter XA, XB, XC and XD are marginal effects averages in pre/post-inflation targeting framework,  
3. XMFX_Y-  Marginal effects after logit; y = Pr(Inflation Targeting) (predict) 
4.  N- Number of observations 
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Table 6: Determinants of IT-Framework Variables 
 
Variables Description and the sources 
ITF 
 
CAGDP 
A dummy variable if IT-framework is in place, zero otherwise. Sources: Leyva, (2008), (Roger, 2010) 
 
Ratio of Current Account Balance (US dollars in Billions) to GDP ((US dollars in Billions)). Sources: 
IFS, East Africa Community, Inter-America Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, African 
Development Bank , International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, January, 2011 
and author‘s calculation. 
 
BMG Broad Money Growth (% annual). Source: IFS, East Africa Community, and WDI.  
 
DPCGDP  Domestic credit to private sector percent of GDP. Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and 
trade credits. Source: WEO, IFS, AFDB and East Africa Community. 
 
LLGDP  
 
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities include currency, demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and other financial institutions. Source: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2009 and IFS. 
 
DEBT Total sum of (public plus private) gross external debt relative to nominal GDP. Source: Reinhart and 
Rogoff, (2010) databases, IFS, World Bank(debt)  
 
CBAGDP 
 
 
PCDMB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GM2 
 
 
 
 
POLITY2 
 
 
INFL_N 
 
 
FLXTR 
 
 
LNRGDP 
 
OPENC 
 
 
TOR 
 
LCBI 
Central Bank Assets relative to nominal GDP. Assets refer to those claims on nonfinancial real sector 
comprised of state actors and non-state. Source: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2009, WDI, and ECB 
 
Private credit provided by the banking sector relative to GDP. Private credit provided by the banking 
sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central 
government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, 
as well as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept 
transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits).Source: Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 2009 and authors . 
 
Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money. Money and quasi money comprise the sum of 
currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, 
savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government.Source: 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
 
Polity2 index (democratic score minus autocratic score. Source: Beck et al (2010), Beck and Demirgüç-
Kunt (2009) and Marshall and Jaggers (2010) 
 
Transformed annual percentage change in consumer price index, Source: WDI, IFS and author 
construction 
 
―De facto‖ Floating exchange rate regime Source: International Monetary Fund coarse exchange rate 
classification and (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004). 
 
Log of Real GDP per capita in logs ((current US$) Source: WDI, IFS.  
 
Trade openness is the ratio of sum of exports and imports to nominal GDP, all at current US dollars.                                  
Source: WDI, IFS and author construction  
 
Governors Turnover Rate Source: Eijffinger and De Haan (1996);Cukierman et al. (1992); Crowe and 
Meade (2007), (Sturm and De Haan 2008),  (De Haan and Kooi 2000) 
 
Legal central Bank independence Index Sources: Cukierman (1992 Cukierman et al. (1992) and 
(Ja'come and Va'zquez (2005) 
 
